package permissions

// security_context_test.go — Test plan for Section 5: SecurityContext (Fix for RC4)
//
// Design ref: SECURITY_REFACTOR_DESIGN.md §5
// Coverage target: Four-tier SecurityContext enum, bypass methods, GetSecurityContext,
//   WithSecurityContext (reason storage), and integration with persistence_service.go
//   check points.
//
// The SecurityContext type lives in shared/pkg/constants/security_context.go and is
// already implemented. These tests lock in the behavioral contract so that
// refactors cannot silently weaken the bypass guarantees.
//
// HOW TO RUN:
//   go test ./internal/features/permissions/ -run TestSecurityContext -v

import (
	"context"
	"testing"

	"github.com/nexuscrm/shared/pkg/constants"
)

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Section 5 — SecurityContext enum values and bypass methods
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

// TestUserContext_NoBypassesByDefault verifies that the zero-value UserContext
// (the default context) does not bypass any security checks.
//
// Assert:
//   UserContext.BypassesProcessFields() == false
//   UserContext.BypassesCRUDandFLS()    == false
//   UserContext.BypassesRLS()           == false
func TestUserContext_NoBypassesByDefault(t *testing.T) {
	sc := constants.UserContext

	if sc.BypassesProcessFields() {
		t.Errorf("UserContext must NOT bypass process fields")
	}
	if sc.BypassesCRUDandFLS() {
		t.Errorf("UserContext must NOT bypass CRUD and FLS")
	}
	if sc.BypassesRLS() {
		t.Errorf("UserContext must NOT bypass RLS")
	}
}

// TestServiceContext_BypassesProcessFieldsOnly verifies that ServiceContext
// bypasses process-field protection but NOT CRUD/FLS or RLS.
//
// Use case: ApprovalService writing ActorId, ProcessInstanceId.
//
// Assert:
//   ServiceContext.BypassesProcessFields() == true
//   ServiceContext.BypassesCRUDandFLS()    == false
//   ServiceContext.BypassesRLS()           == false
func TestServiceContext_BypassesProcessFieldsOnly(t *testing.T) {
	sc := constants.ServiceContext

	if !sc.BypassesProcessFields() {
		t.Errorf("ServiceContext must bypass process fields")
	}
	if sc.BypassesCRUDandFLS() {
		t.Errorf("ServiceContext must NOT bypass CRUD and FLS")
	}
	if sc.BypassesRLS() {
		t.Errorf("ServiceContext must NOT bypass RLS")
	}
}

// TestElevatedContext_BypassesCRUDAndFLSButNotRLS verifies that ElevatedContext
// bypasses process fields AND CRUD/FLS but NOT RLS.
//
// Sharing rules still apply for elevated-context callers (real user audit trail).
//
// Assert:
//   ElevatedContext.BypassesProcessFields() == true
//   ElevatedContext.BypassesCRUDandFLS()    == true
//   ElevatedContext.BypassesRLS()           == false
func TestElevatedContext_BypassesCRUDAndFLSButNotRLS(t *testing.T) {
	sc := constants.ElevatedContext

	if !sc.BypassesProcessFields() {
		t.Errorf("ElevatedContext must bypass process fields")
	}
	if !sc.BypassesCRUDandFLS() {
		t.Errorf("ElevatedContext must bypass CRUD and FLS")
	}
	if sc.BypassesRLS() {
		t.Errorf("ElevatedContext must NOT bypass RLS (sharing rules still apply)")
	}
}

// TestSystemContext_BypassesAllChecks verifies that SystemContext bypasses every
// security layer: process fields, CRUD/FLS, and RLS.
//
// Use case: Bootstrap, system logging, recent-item tracking.
//
// Assert:
//   SystemContext.BypassesProcessFields() == true
//   SystemContext.BypassesCRUDandFLS()    == true
//   SystemContext.BypassesRLS()           == true
func TestSystemContext_BypassesAllChecks(t *testing.T) {
	sc := constants.SystemContext

	if !sc.BypassesProcessFields() {
		t.Errorf("SystemContext must bypass process fields")
	}
	if !sc.BypassesCRUDandFLS() {
		t.Errorf("SystemContext must bypass CRUD and FLS")
	}
	if !sc.BypassesRLS() {
		t.Errorf("SystemContext must bypass RLS")
	}
}

// TestSecurityContextOrdering_ExplicitValues verifies the explicit numeric values
// match the design spec. These must NEVER be reordered (A8 fix: explicit values,
// not iota, prevent reorder bugs).
//
// Assert:
//   UserContext == 0, ServiceContext == 10, ElevatedContext == 20, SystemContext == 30
func TestSecurityContextOrdering_ExplicitValues(t *testing.T) {
	if constants.UserContext != 0 {
		t.Errorf("UserContext must be 0, got %d", constants.UserContext)
	}
	if constants.ServiceContext != 10 {
		t.Errorf("ServiceContext must be 10, got %d", constants.ServiceContext)
	}
	if constants.ElevatedContext != 20 {
		t.Errorf("ElevatedContext must be 20, got %d", constants.ElevatedContext)
	}
	if constants.SystemContext != 30 {
		t.Errorf("SystemContext must be 30, got %d", constants.SystemContext)
	}
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Section 5 — GetSecurityContext: returns UserContext by default
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

// TestGetSecurityContext_DefaultIsUserContext verifies that a plain context.Background()
// (with no security level set) returns UserContext (0).
//
// Assert: GetSecurityContext(context.Background()) == UserContext
func TestGetSecurityContext_DefaultIsUserContext(t *testing.T) {
	got := constants.GetSecurityContext(context.Background())
	if got != constants.UserContext {
		t.Errorf("expected UserContext(0) for plain context, got %d", got)
	}
}

// TestGetSecurityContext_ReturnsSetLevel verifies that after WithSecurityContext
// sets a level, GetSecurityContext returns that same level.
//
// Assert: GetSecurityContext returns SystemContext after WithSecurityContext(SystemContext, ...)
func TestGetSecurityContext_ReturnsSetLevel(t *testing.T) {
	ctx := constants.WithSecurityContext(context.Background(), constants.SystemContext, "bootstrap: test")
	got := constants.GetSecurityContext(ctx)
	if got != constants.SystemContext {
		t.Errorf("expected SystemContext(30), got %d", got)
	}
}

// TestGetSecurityContext_ServiceContextRoundTrip verifies WithSecurityContext /
// GetSecurityContext round-trip for ServiceContext.
func TestGetSecurityContext_ServiceContextRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
	ctx := constants.WithSecurityContext(context.Background(), constants.ServiceContext, "approval: writing ActorId")
	got := constants.GetSecurityContext(ctx)
	if got != constants.ServiceContext {
		t.Errorf("expected ServiceContext(10), got %d", got)
	}
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Section 5 — Check point: persistence_service.go integration stubs
//
// These are declared as stubs here. Full tests live in the records package
// where persistence_service is accessible.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

// TestPersistenceService_UserContext_EnforcesProcessFields_IntegrationStub documents
// that persistence_service.go enforces process-field protection when context is
// UserContext (default).
//
// Full test location: internal/features/records/persistence_service_security_test.go
//
// Setup: call persistence service Insert with UserContext; include a process-protected
//   field (e.g., ProcessInstanceId) in the record.
// Assert: error returned referencing the process-protected field
func TestPersistenceService_UserContext_EnforcesProcessFields_IntegrationStub(t *testing.T) {
	t.Skip("integration stub — implement in internal/features/records/")
	t.Log("Assert: Insert with UserContext rejects process-protected fields")
}

// TestPersistenceService_ServiceContext_BypassesProcessFieldProtection_IntegrationStub
// documents that ServiceContext allows writing process-protected fields.
//
// Assert: Insert with ServiceContext succeeds when process-protected fields are present
func TestPersistenceService_ServiceContext_BypassesProcessFieldProtection_IntegrationStub(t *testing.T) {
	t.Skip("integration stub — implement in internal/features/records/")
	t.Log("Assert: Insert with ServiceContext allows process-protected fields")
}

// TestPersistenceService_ServiceContext_PreservesCRUDandFLSChecks_IntegrationStub
// documents that ServiceContext does NOT bypass CRUD or FLS.
//
// Assert: Update with ServiceContext still fails if user lacks Edit permission
func TestPersistenceService_ServiceContext_PreservesCRUDandFLSChecks_IntegrationStub(t *testing.T) {
	t.Skip("integration stub — implement in internal/features/records/")
	t.Log("Assert: ServiceContext does NOT bypass CRUD or FLS checks")
}

// TestPersistenceService_SystemContext_BypassesAllChecks_IntegrationStub documents
// that SystemContext bypasses CRUD, FLS, and RLS.
//
// Assert: Insert with SystemContext proceeds regardless of permissions
func TestPersistenceService_SystemContext_BypassesAllChecks_IntegrationStub(t *testing.T) {
	t.Skip("integration stub — implement in internal/features/records/")
	t.Log("Assert: Insert with SystemContext bypasses all permission checks")
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Section 5 — Bypass method monotonicity contract
//
// The bypass methods must form a monotonic chain:
//   UserContext ⊂ ServiceContext ⊂ ElevatedContext ⊂ SystemContext
// A higher level always includes all bypasses of lower levels.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

// TestBypassMonotonicity_ServiceContextIncludesUserContextBypasses verifies
// that ServiceContext has all bypasses of UserContext (vacuously true: UserContext
// has none) and additionally bypasses process fields.
func TestBypassMonotonicity_AllLevelsFormMonotonicChain(t *testing.T) {
	levels := []constants.SecurityContext{
		constants.UserContext,
		constants.ServiceContext,
		constants.ElevatedContext,
		constants.SystemContext,
	}

	// BypassesProcessFields must be monotonically non-decreasing
	for i := 1; i < len(levels); i++ {
		prev, curr := levels[i-1], levels[i]
		if prev.BypassesProcessFields() && !curr.BypassesProcessFields() {
			t.Errorf("level %d bypasses process fields but higher level %d does not (non-monotonic)", prev, curr)
		}
		if prev.BypassesCRUDandFLS() && !curr.BypassesCRUDandFLS() {
			t.Errorf("level %d bypasses CRUD/FLS but higher level %d does not (non-monotonic)", prev, curr)
		}
		if prev.BypassesRLS() && !curr.BypassesRLS() {
			t.Errorf("level %d bypasses RLS but higher level %d does not (non-monotonic)", prev, curr)
		}
	}
}